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Peer-Assisted Social Media Streaming with
Social Reciprocity
Zhi Wang, Student Member, IEEE, Chuan Wu, Member, IEEE, Lifeng Sun, Member, IEEE,
and Shiqiang Yang, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Online video sharing and social networking are
cross-pollinating rapidly in today’s Internet: Online social net-
work users are sharing more and more media contents among
each other, while online video sharing sites are leveraging social
connections among users to promote their videos. An intriguing
development as it is, the operational challenge in previous video
sharing systems persists, i.e., the large server cost demanded for
scaling of the systems. Peer-to-peer video sharing could be a
rescue, only if the video viewers’ mutual resource contribution
has been fully incentivized and efficiently scheduled. Exploring
the unique advantages of a social network based video sharing
system, we advocate to utilize social reciprocities among peers
with social relationships for efficient contribution incentivization
and scheduling, so as to enable high-quality video streaming
with low server cost. We exploit social reciprocity with two
give-and-take ratios at each peer: (1) peer contribution ratio
(PCR), which evaluates the reciprocity level between a pair of
social friends, and (2) system contribution ratio (SCR), which
records the give-and-take level of the user to and from the entire
system. We design efficient peer-to-peer mechanisms for video
streaming using the two ratios, where each user optimally decides
which other users to seek relay help from and help in relaying
video streams, respectively, based on combined evaluations of
their social relationship and historical reciprocity levels. Our
design achieves effective incentives for resource contribution, load
balancing among relay peers, as well as efficient social-aware re-
source scheduling. We also discuss practical implementation and
implement our design in a prototype social media sharing system.
Our extensive evaluations based on PlanetLab experiments verify
that high-quality large-scale social media sharing can be achieved
with conservative server costs.
Index Terms—Social media streaming, social reciprocity, peer
incentive, resource allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENT years have seen the blossom of online socialnetworks (e.g., Facebook [1], Google+ [2]) and video
sharing sites (e.g., YouTube [3]), as well as a convergence
Manuscript received February 4, 2012; revised July 13, 2012. The associate
editors coordinating the review of this paper and approving it for publication
were B. Lin, J. Xu, and P. Sinha.
This work has been partially supported by the National Basic Research
Program of China (973) under Grant No. 2011CB302206, the National
Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 60933013/61272231,
the National Significant Science and Technology Projects of China under
Grant No. 2012ZX01039001-003, and the Research Grants Council of Hong
Kong (RGC GRF Ref: HKU 718710E).
Z. Wang, L. Sun, and S. Yang are with the Department of Computer Science
and Technology, Beijing Key Laboratory of Networked Multimedia, Tsinghua
University, Beijing, China (e-mail: wangzhi04@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn, {sunlf,
yangshq}@tsinghua.edu.cn).
C. Wu is with the Department of Computer Science, the University of Hong
Kong, Hong Kong (e-mail: cwu@cs.hku.hk).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TNSM.2012.12.120244
trend between the two types of systems. More and more media
contents (video clips, images, etc.) are published and shared
among users on social network sites [4], [5], while the video
sharing systems are increasingly leveraging social networks to
promote their videos and attract viewers [6], [7].
To support efficient video sharing in a social network,
similar challenges as faced by traditional online video sharing
sites remain: a huge amount of server bandwidth is expected
to be provisioned, in order to distribute the large volumes of
videos generated and uploaded by users, e.g., more than 60
hours’ worth of videos are uploaded every minute in YouTube
and served to millions of users per minute. Peer-to-peer (P2P)
technology has been advocated to alleviate the server load in
video streaming applications [8], [9], such that users (peers)
directly send video streams to each other, with less dependence
on the dedicated servers. Challenges remain in a peer-assisted
design, among which incentivizing sufficient and stable peer
bandwidth contribution has been a fundamental one.
There have been a number of P2P incentive designs based
on direct or indirect resource trading [10], [11], but none
of them has utilized social connections among the peers.
The unique setting of a social media sharing system has
made very promising a more effective social reciprocity based
incentive for P2P video streaming over a social network, that
exploits the natural intentionality for each peer to help socially
connected peers.
In this paper, we design a social media sharing system
which utilizes social reciprocity to incentivize effective band-
width contribution and scheduling at the users, and employ
peer-assisted design to distribute video streams with low server
cost. We motivate our design with extensive measurement
studies of traces collected from Renren [12], one of the largest
online social network sites in China. In Renren’s traces, we
observe that it is common for users to generate videos in the
online social network. Meanwhile, the videos generated by
users have attracted many viewers. As more and more users
in the online social network are generating and consuming
videos, it has become a practical problem to design peer-
assisted video distribution strategies for social media sharing.
In Renren’s traces, we also discover that videos are not only
shared among friend peers, but also among stranger peers. To
design social-aware incentive for peer-assisted video sharing,
we consider resource sharing between friends and between
non-friends.
An user (peer) in our system is responsible to send its own
video stream to all other interested users, either directly if
1932-4537/13/$31.00 c© 2013 IEEE
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it has sufficient upload bandwidth, or by resorting to relay
helpers when there are too many viewers. Our key design is
to effectively incentivize peers with extra upload bandwidth to
serve as relay helpers in others’ stream distribution, for which
we exploit social reciprocities. We define two light-weighted
give-and-take ratios at each peer: (1) peer contribution ratio
(PCR), which evaluates the historical reciprocity level between
a pair of social friends, and (2) system contribution ratio
(SCR), that records the give-and-take level of the user to and
from the entire network. A social reciprocity index (RI) is
defined at each user to evaluate each other peer, based on
the two give-and-take ratios and the strength of relationship
between them two. This index is used in the design of two
efficient algorithms for each user to optimally decide which
other users to seek relay help from and help in relaying video
streams, respectively.
Our design is able to achieve the following effectiveness: (1)
peers are maximally incentivized to contribute their available
upload resources, (2) load on different relay peers is effectively
balanced, and (3) upload bandwidth in the system is efficiently
scheduled with social awareness (or social preference), in that
users are more inclined to seek help from and help other users
with closer social ties.
We have also designed detailed practical protocols to
achieve our design, and implemented a prototype social media
streaming system. The implementation is extensively evaluated
with experiments on PlanetLab, which validate the efficiency
and effectiveness of our design in achieving high-quality large-
scale social media streaming with low server costs.
This study is based on our previous work on peer-assisted
social games [13], but addresses the new problem in social
media sharing with social reciprocity. We summarize the major
new contributions of this study as follows: (1) We conduct
measurement studies based on extensive Renren traces, where
the observations well motivate our social reciprocity based
incentive design in a peer-assisted social media streaming
system; (2) We address the specific design challenge of a peer-
assisted social media sharing system, such as how to design
algorithms for resource allocation in social media sharing,
how to carry out the algorithms when peers who generate
the videos are not online, etc.; (3) A new prototype social
media streaming system is implemented, and our design is ex-
tensively evaluated with trace-driven PlanetLab experiments,
based on the Renren traces.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss
related literature in Sec. II, and present our measurement study
of Renren in Sec. III. We introduce the system model and the
design of two give-and-take ratios in Sec. IV, and present
detailed algorithm design in Sec. V. We analyze the effec-
tiveness of our design in Sec. VI. We then present extensive
evaluation results based on a prototype implementation and
PlanetLab experiments in Sec. VII. Finally, we conclude the
paper in Sec. VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
We survey literature on peer-assisted social content sharing
and social-aware incentives, respectively.
A. Peer-Assisted Social Content Sharing
The P2P paradigm has been successfully utilized in online
file sharing and video streaming, e.g., BitTorrent [14], PPLive
[8]. Especially, it has been proven successful in distributing
both live [15] and on-demand contents to large numbers of
viewers [16]. In P2P streaming, each peer (user or client)
caches media chunks of videos it has watched, and distributes
these chunks to other peers by direct, mutual exchanges, so
as to save the server’s upload bandwidth.
As more and more contents are now generated and available
in the online social networks, the P2P paradigm has recently
been employed to assist in content distribution over an online
social network. For P2P file sharing, Pouwelse et al. [17]
have designed Tribler, which makes use of social connection
and trust among users to improve content discovery, recom-
mendation, and downloading. For video sharing, Cheng et
al. [18] propose a peer-assisted design for distributing short
videos on YouTube-like video sharing sites, by exploiting
social characteristics such as the “small-world” phenomenon.
In Wang et al.’s study [19], they verify that online social
networks have become important platforms for producing and
consuming video contents. They observe that choices of videos
a user watches depend not only on the general popularity of
the videos, but also on who share the videos. They further
design a prefetching strategy to reduce the startup delay in
social media streaming, based on users’ interest in the videos.
B. Social-Aware Incentives
Incentive engineering has been an important issue of P2P
networking since its inception [20]. Different strategies have
been designed to encourage peers’ mutual sharing of upload
resources, e.g., tit-for-tat as used in BitTorrent [21], reputation
systems [22], and other game-theoretical approaches [23].
Recently, Liu et al. [24] have observed that better file
sharing performance can be achieved in some private P2P file
sharing systems, by applying an admission control mechanism
based on upload/download ratio of each peer. In their design,
the system records a balance between the total number of
uploaded bytes and the total number of downloaded bytes
at each peer. Peers can join the system only when their
upload/download ratio is above a certain threshold. Liu et
al. observe that such admission control can improve the
contribution levels of peers in P2P file sharing. In our work,
we focus on incentive design in the context of a social
media sharing network, and exploit not only system-level
give-and-take balances at the peers, but also pair-wise mutual
contributions between a pair of socially connected friends.
Liu et al. [25] design a network-wide tit-for-tat mechanism
for P2P content sharing, where peers can trade resources for
contents along a social relation chain. In their design, each
pair of peers maintains a limit of the resource that they can
provide to each other. Two peers can exchange resources only
when a path of social connections can be established between
them, and resources and contents will be transferred along the
connected social path.
Li et al. [26] enable social preferences during message
routing in a delay tolerant network, where nodes are more
likely to route messages for those with social relationships.
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Such a social preference is modeled into an optimal routing
decision problem, and the authors design efficient algorithms
to solve it accordingly.
III. MOTIVATION FROM REAL-WORLD TRACES
To motivate our design of a social media sharing system,
we first present our measurement study based on extensive
traces collected from Renren.
A. Collection of Traces
Renren is a Facebook-like online social network site, at-
tracting more than 160 million users mainly from China [27].
On Renren, users can create and maintain social connections
among each other, as well as post and view various contents
generated by connected ones. We obtained runtime traces from
the technical team of Renren, which contain about 100, 000
users’ online activities in the entire span of July 2010. On
Renren, users can import video links to videos hosted on other
video sharing sites (e.g., Youku, Tudou, Xunlei), and users
clicking on those links can directly view the videos on their
Renren pages.
In this paper, our target is to design effective incentive and
resource allocation mechanisms for peer-assisted social media
sharing. Though Renren is not an exact social media sharing
site that we consider (since it does not host video contents
itself), the traces nevertheless can reflect patterns of interest
of users on generating videos and viewing others’ videos.
Using these traces, we study how peer-assisted mechanisms
can be designed to effectively serve videos to users, to
satisfy their video viewing interest. We exploit the following
information from the traces: (1) The social graph, containing
social connections among the users; (2) Video import entry,
which records the video links imported by a user from an
external video sharing site; (3) Video viewing entry, which
records the videos viewed by a user.
B. Importing Videos Is Common in an Online Social Network
The video links shared by Renren users may correspond
to videos they themselves generated and uploaded to a video
sharing site, or videos produced by others. As an approximate
approach, we use the distribution of the number of video links
imported by users into Renren, to reflect the distribution of
the number of videos that users on a social media sharing site
may produce. Fig. 1 illustrates the sorted number of video
links imported by users into Renren, based on trace data in
the first week of July 2010. We observe that the distribution of
the numbers of videos imported by different users is highly
skewed. It follows a zipf distribution. Correspondingly, the
more videos a user in a social media sharing site produces,
the more bandwidth it requires to distribute the videos to
interested viewers.
C. Videos Imported Can Attract Many Viewers
After the video links are imported into Renren, they attract
viewers in the online social network. Fig. 2 plots the number
of viewers of a video on Renren, after it is imported into the
social network. We observe that some videos can be viewed
by many users. In a social media sharing system that we will
design, peers whose generated videos attract a large number
of views, will need other peers’ help in distributing the videos,
while other peers whose videos have fewer views can provide
such help. In our media sharing design, we model how a single
video is distributed by peers, and the model can be extended
to address when multiple videos are generated by users.
D. Videos Are Shared Between Friends and Non-Friends
We further investigate the fraction of the views from socially
connected friends and that from non-friends. Based on Renren
traces, we have observed that around 40% of the video shares
are between directly connected friends. Fig. 3 shows the
distribution of video views from friends and all, respectively.
In a peer-assisted social media sharing system, videos
produced by a peer can be viewed by many other users,
which are either socially connected peers of the source, or
strangers. When a peer seeks other peers’ help in distributing
its generated video, there are two cases: if the viewers are
mainly from friends, it can rely on the pair-wise reciprocity
between itself and socially connected friends; if the viewers
are mainly strangers, it can still receive relay help by resorting
to its previously cumulated system-wise contribution. Our
design in Sec. V will detail the two situations.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present our social media streaming
network, define social relationships in the system, and intro-
duce the two give-and-take ratios designed to exploit social
reciprocity.
A. Peer-Assisted Media Sharing
We consider a large-scale video sharing network, where
a user may generate at most one video, and a number of
other users are interested in viewing the video(s). The user
that generates a video is referred to as the source peer of
the video, and users which download and view this video
are viewers of the video. In our peer-assisted design, the
source peer is responsible to distribute its video stream to
all the viewers. The peer may directly send the video stream
to its viewers if its upload bandwidth suffices, or ask other
peers to help relay, when there are too many viewers such
that its upload bandwidth is not sufficient to serve all. These
helpers are referred to as relay helpers or relays in short.
An illustration of the system is illustrated in Fig. 4, where
“S” denotes a source peer that produces the video and “V”
represents viewers, which may download the video from the
source peer directly or from the relay peer “R”. A viewer can
further distribute a received video stream to other viewers.
Let Vi denote the set of viewers of a particular video
produced by source peer i. We use Ri to denote the set of at
most K candidate helpers for a source peer i Since a relay
peer may help more than one source peer concurrently, we
denote the set of source peers requesting relay help from relay
j as Sj . In the example scenario in Fig. 5, a, b and c are 3
source peers sharing 3 videos, which we assume have the
same streaming rate, respectively. We have viewers d, f ∈ Va,
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Fig. 3. Number of views from friends and non-
friends.
g ∈ Vc, and e, h ∈ Vb, relay helpers c, d ∈ Ra, c, e ∈ Rb,
and Rc = {a, b}. Here peer c plays the roles of source peer
and relay peer simultaneously.
We assume upload bandwidth at peers constitutes the band-
width bottleneck, but download bandwidth at peers is always
sufficiently large. There are a small number of dedicated
servers in the system to serve as backup relay peers, which
are resorted to when a source peer cannot find sufficient relay
peers. A tracker server keeps track of all online users in the
system.
The aim of our design is to effectively incentivize peers to
serve as relay helpers for each other using their spare capacity,
by exploring social reciprocity among peers, as well as to
efficiently schedule upload capacity at peers, which optimizes
the utilization of resources in the entire system while taking
peers’ social preferences into consideration.
B. Social Network Model
We assume that social relationships among the users can be
organized into a social graph, where each node represents a
peer, and a bidirectional edge exists between two nodes when
the two peers are socially connected (e.g., friends, relatives,
etc.), which we refer to as social friends hereinafter. A weight
fij ∈ [0, 1] is associated with each edge in the social graph,
denoting the strength of social connection between peer i
and peer j (e.g., strength of friendship). Social relationship is
symmetric, i.e., fij = fji. A larger fij represents a stronger
relationship, and fij = 0 denotes no existing relationship.
Viewers of a video produced by peer i can be its social friends
or non-friends.
Peers in the video sharing system are supposed to have a
social preference, i.e., they wish to help their social friends
more than the other general population. We exploit social
reciprocity among peers in our incentive design: (1) We make
use of the direct reciprocity between social friends who are
socially connected, as peers are naturally willing to help their
social friends and receive their help from time to time in
return; (2) We exploit indirect reciprocity among a peer and all
other peers in the system, where a peer contributes resources
to the system expects to receive resource contribution from
others as well, although they are not socially connected. Our
design will take the above direct and indirect reciprocities into
consideration.
C. Two Give-And-Take Ratios
Two ratios are defined to evaluate the level of direct and
indirect reciprocities in our system.
Fig. 4. An illustration of
peer-assisted media sharing:
a single video.
Fig. 5. An illustration of peer-assisted media
sharing: multiple videos.
Peer Contribution Ratio (PCR). Peer contribution ra-
tio evaluates the give-and-take balance between two social
friends. PCR Wj(i) is defined as the ratio of peer i’s upload
contribution to peer j over the total mutual contributions
between the two:
Wj(i) =
Cj(i)
Ci(j) + Cj(i)
.
Here, Cj(i) is the total number of upload bytes that peer i
has historically provided for relaying peer j’s video stream,
and Ci(j) vice versa. Wj(i) > 12 represents that peer i has
contributed more to peer j, and Wj(i) < 12 vice versa.
System Contribution Ratio (SCR). To evaluate each peer’s
contribution in the entire system, we also define a system
contribution ratio wi as follows:
wi =
y′i
y′i + yi
.
Here y′i is the total number of upload bytes peer i has ever
provided for relaying other peers’ streams, and yi is the overall
upload bytes of resources others have provided for relaying
peer i’s stream.
The two ratios are used in our incentive design and resource
scheduling, in which peers contributing more to their social
friends receive more help from the latter, and for peers with
few social friends, providing more relay help to the general
others will receive more help in return as well. Detailed design
will be discussed in the following section.
In our design, peers who have cached the videos are
incentivized to contribute to others. Such candidate peers are
utilized in two cases as follows: (1) When the source peer
is online, it finds the candidate peers who have cached the
videos, and asks them to upload the videos to the viewers;
(2) When the source peer is not online, the tracker server is
responsible for finding online relays which cache the video
and assigning viewers of the video to the relay peers. In both
cases, candidate peers who have cached the videos are utilized.
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TABLE I
NOTATIONS
Symbol Definition
PCR Peer contribution ratio
SCR System contribution ratio
RI Social reciprocity index
y′i The amount of upload resource peer i has contributed to
the system
yi The amount of upload resource others have provided to
i
Ci(j) The amount of upload resource peer j has provided to i
wi The system contribution ratio of peer i
Wi(j) The peer contribution ratio of peer j between the pair of
peer i and j
fij The social closeness between peer j and peer i
ei(j) The social reciprocity index of peer j evaluated by peer
i
Vi The viewer set of source peer i
Ri The relay set of source peer i
Sj The requesting source set of relay peer j
ui The upload capacity of relay peer i
ri The stream rate of the video generated by i
x
(T )
ij The number of viewers that i asks relay j to serve in
time slot T
a
(T )
ji The number of viewers that relay j is to serve for source
peer i in time slot T
L The number of candidate relay peers provided by the
tracker server
K The maximum number of relay peers a source maintains
Th The duration of a time slot
The contribution ratios are recorded for the relays accordingly,
so that they can be incentivized to help, improving the chance
for others to help them in return when they are acting as source
peers.
We summarize important notations in the paper in Table I.
V. DETAILED DESIGN: CONTRIBUTION INCENTIVIZATION
AND RESOURCE SCHEDULING
We now present our detailed incentive design for relay
resource contribution, through a social reciprocity index that
we define, and efficient strategies that peers apply to schedule
their resources.
A. Social Reciprocity Index (RI)
We design a social reciprocity index ei(j) for each peer i
to evaluate its perceived contribution level from another peer
j, based on the two give-and-take ratios and the strength of
social relationship between them two, as follows:
ei(j) = (1− fij)wj + fijWi(j).
The rationale of this index is as follows: If peer j has
a stronger social relationship (i.e., large fij) with peer i, i
evaluates j more based on relay help j has provided to itself
(i.e., Wi(j)). If little social relationship exists between peer
i and peer j (i.e., small fij), i evaluates j more according
to relative contributions j has made to the entire system (i.e.,
wj).
This index is used in two effective strategies for each source
to choose which other peers to seek relay help from, and for
each relay to optimally decide which source peers to help,
respectively. Specifically, each source will choose peers with
smaller RI values it evaluates as relay helpers, and each relay
tends to help sources with larger RI values it has evaluated.
The idea is four-fold: (1) A source peer i prefers requesting
relay help from social friends which it has helped a lot
historically (i.e., smaller Wi(j)), or from other peers whose
contribution level to the entire system is low (i.e., smaller wj);
(2) A relay peer j favors helping its social friends which it
has received a lot of help from historically (i.e., larger Wj(i)),
or other peers whose contribution level to the entire system is
high (i.e., larger wi); (3) Social friends exchange relay help
more according to the level of direct reciprocity evaluated
by PCRs; (4) Peers with little social connections contribute
relay resources among each other more according to SCRs,
enabling multilateral reciprocity in the entire system. Detailed
algorithms and rationale discussions follow in the next two
sub sections.
B. Source Peer’s Algorithm: Selecting Relay Helpers
When the number of viewers of the video source peer i
produces exceeds its upload capacity, i seeks relay helpers.
Three steps are involved: (1) source i chooses relays among a
candidate set Ri, which contains potential relay helpers with
spare upload bandwidth that i has acquired from the tracker
server1; (2) source i estimates how many viewers each selected
relay peer may possibly help with, and then (3) it assigns
specific viewers to each selected relay peer.
1) Selecting Relays: When a source peer asks the tracker
server for candidate relays, the tracker will assign it with the
relay peers that are geographically closer to its friends. Source
peer i ranks all relay candidates in Ri which have spare upload
capacities to share in ascending order of their RIs ei(j), ∀j ∈
Ri, and chooses peers to request relay help from in this order.
In this way, as discussed in Sec. V-A, source peer i prefers
social friends which it has helped a lot and asked little, or
other peers which have contributed less to the system but taken
more. The reason lies in that those peers are more likely to
agree to help the source in serving the video chunks, according
to the decision algorithm to be discussed in Sec. V-C, in order
to regain their give-and-take balance.
2) Estimating Relay’s Available Upload Bandwidth: Each
candidate relay peer, which has spare bandwidth (besides
sending its own video to its viewers if it is also a source),
may potentially help multiple other source peers. To decide
how many viewers a relay can upload the video to, i carries
out a probing algorithm: For new relay peer j, i randomly
decides an initial number of viewers, x(0)ij , to relay j. In each
following time slot T , if the viewers assigned to relay j can
all download the video from j in T − 1, i will try to assign
one more viewer to relay j; otherwise, if only a(T−1)ji viewers
(a(T−1)ji < x(T−1)ij ) are served, i will adjust x(T−1)ij to a(T−1)ji ,
1Implementation details on how a source peer learns about viewers and
candidate relay peers will be discussed in Sec. V-D
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i.e.,
x
(T )
ij =
{
x
(T−1)
ij + 1, if a
(T−1)
ji = x
(T−1)
ij ,
a
(T−1)
ji , if a
(T−1)
ji < x
(T−1)
ij ,
T = 1, 2, . . .
Since a source peer only maintains at most K relay candi-
dates, the ones with smallest estimate relay capacities will be
eliminated from Ri.
3) Assigning Viewers to Relays: After relay peers are
selected, the source peer decides which viewers to be served
via which relays: we assume that source i is able to estimate
the round-trip-times (RTT) between each viewer and each
relay (e.g., by referring to a network coordinate system [28]);
it assigns a viewer to the relay peer with the smallest RTT in
between.
Our design considers only one-hop relay of social media
streams, i.e., a relay peer receives the social media stream
from the source peer and then forwards to viewers directly,
since more relay hops may well add to delay and complexity
of the media distribution. In the case that the aggregate upload
bandwidth of source i and all its relay peers is not enough
to distribute the stream at rate ri to all viewers, servers are
resorted to serve as relays.
The algorithm carried out by each source peer is summa-
rized in Algorithm 1. At source peer i, RelaySchedule is
called periodically. In line 1 − 3, the stream is delivered to
all viewers by source i directly if its upload capacity suffices.
Otherwise, it resorts to the relay peers, by selecting the relay
helpers that have minimum RIs (line 7), and assigning the
number of viewers according to their upload capacity (line
11 − 12), which is estimated using the probing strategy dis-
cussed. Notice that source i never waits for upload notification
from relay peers, since the upload capacities (xij(T )) are
updated by upload allocation (a(T−1)ji ) in the previous round.
When the source peer is able to address the remaining viewers,
it will stop requesting relay peers (line 9); and source peer i
reserves one slot of its upload capacity (equal to its streaming
rate ri), so that it can send its video stream to the server for
relaying when capacities from relay peers are not enough.
C. Relay Peer’s Algorithm: Scheduling Upload Contribution
When a peer has extra service capacity (beyond that used
for distributing its own video to its viewers), it may register
itself as a candidate relay with the tracker server, and may take
itself down from the candidate list when its upload bandwidth
is fully used. The voluntary helper registration is incentivized
by our upload scheduling algorithm, to be discussed next.
The tracker server may provide each candidate relay peer
to multiple source peers, and therefore each candidate relay
can receive multiple requests from different sources simultane-
ously. When relay peer j’s spare service capacity is not enough
to serve all the source peers’ requests, it chooses the source
peers to help, prioritizing those with large social reciprocity
indices (ej(i)’s) it evaluates. Specifically, a relay periodically
decides the source peers it helps in each time slot T , among
the set of source peers Sj , which request relay help from
itself. On the other hand, once a source peer i is chosen, it is
guaranteed that relay j will distribute videos to i’s viewers for
Algorithm 1 Source Peer’s Algorithm.
1: procedure RELAY SCHEDULE
2: if ui ≥ |Vi|ri then
3: i will distribute the video stream to all viewers
directly
4: else
5: Sort Ri in ascending order of RIs (ei(j)’s)
6: Let y denote the number of viewers to be served
by relay peers
7: for all relay peer j in sorted list Ri do
8: if i is able to distribute to the y viewers or its
upload bandwidth is smaller than 2ri then
9: break
10: end if
11: x(T )ij ← x(T−1)ij + 1, if a(T−1)ji = x(T−1)ij ;
otherwise x(T )ij ← a(T−1)ji
12: min{x(T )ij , y} viewers are assigned to relay
peer j
13: Send to relay j the video stream together with
the list of assigned viewers
14: y ← y −min{x(T )ij , y}
15: u ← u− ri
16: end for
17: Send the stream to remaining viewers one by one
until i’s remaining upload bandwidth is smaller than 2ri
18: Resort to the server for relaying to all remaining
viewers
19: end if
20: end procedure
the duration of the time slot (Th), in order to avoid inefficiency
caused by frequent relay switches.
Let a(T )ji denote the number of viewers that relay j is to
serve for source peer i in time slot T . Let x(T )ij be the number
of viewers that i asks relay j to serve uj is the maximum
spare upload bandwidth of peer j. The source selection and
upload scheduling problem is formulated into the following
optimization problem:
max
∑
i∈Sj
ej(i)a
(T )
ji
subject to:
a
(T )
ji ≤ x(T )ij , ∀i ∈ Sj ,∑
i∈Sj
a
(T )
ji ri ≤ uj ,
a
(T )
ji ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, ∀i ∈ Sj .
To solve this integer linear program for a(T )ji ’s, we design
the following heuristic: Relay peer j first allocates upload
capacity of |Vj |rj for its own stream distribution. Then j
maximally allocates its spare upload bandwidth (uj − |Vj |rj)
to source peers (i’s) in descending order of their social reci-
procity indices (ej(i)’s), according to the number of viewers
each source has asked j to forward streams to (x(T )ij ), until
its upload bandwidth becomes insufficient to forward a whole
stream. In this way, social friends which have helped j a lot
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Algorithm 2 Relay Peer’s Algorithm.
1: procedure UPLOAD ALLOCATE
2: u ← uj − |Vj |rj
3: Sort source peers in Sj in descending order of RIs
(ej(i)’s)
4: for all source peer i in sorted list Sj do
5: a(T )ji ← min{x(T )ij , u/ri}
6: u ← u− a(T )ji
7: end for
8: Send upload allocation a(T )ji to source peer i, ∀i ∈ Sj
9: On receiving video requests from i’s viewers, j serves
videos to corresponding viewers
10: end procedure
previously, or others which have contributed significantly to
the entire system, will be given higher priority.
The algorithm carried out by each relay peer is summarized
in Algorithm 2, which is invoked at the beginning of each
time slot. In line 2, the relay determines its spare upload
capacity, and then allocates it to source peers according to
their RIs. After that, the relay peer sends the upload allocation
notification a(T )ji to all source peers in Sj (line 8), and the latter
will adjust their requests to other relay peers as discussed in
the source peer’s algorithm. Upon receiving video requests
from viewers of the corresponding source peers, the relay peer
uploads the videos to them (line 9).
We note that source peers are allocated upload slots ac-
cording to how much help they have provided historically,
as captured in ej(i). This incentivizes a peer with spare
upload resource to contribute relay help (by registering with
the tracker server), such that when it needs relay help for
distributing its own video streams, its social reciprocity indices
can rank high at other peers, and it can easily receive relay
help in return. More discussions on effectiveness of our design
will be given in Sec. VI.
D. Implementation Discussions
We next discuss key implementation issues of our design
in practice.
1) Maintenance of Give-And-Take Ratios: The amount of
resources a peer i has contributed to/taken from its social
friends and the entire system, i.e., Cj(i)’s, Ci(j)’s, y′i, and
yi, are recorded since peer i registered an account with the
system. In our implementation, mutual resource contributions
between peer i and peer j (Cj(i) and Ci(j)) are maintained
at both i and j, while system contributions of each peer i
(y′i and yi) are maintained by the tracker server, similar to
that in the existing private P2P file sharing systems [29]. In
particular, after relay j helps source i in serving aji viewers for
a time slot, Ci(j) maintained at both peer i and peer j will be
increased by the total number of upload bytes Δ = a(T )ji rTh,
while yi and y′j maintained at the tracker server will be
increased by Δ as well.
2) Tracker Assistance: A source peer i seeks candidate
relay helpers from the tracker. In our design, each peer reports
its cache state to the tracker, i.e., which videos are stored in
the peer’s local storage. Upon receiving the requests for relay
peers from a source peer, the tracker randomly chooses at most
L = 20 relay peers that have spare upload bandwidth to share
in the system (i.e., peers that have registered themselves at
the tracker to help others) and send the relay list to the source
peer.
When a source peer of a video is online, it is responsible to
distribute its video, and assigns viewers to relay helpers. When
the source peer is offline, the tracker server is responsible
for finding online relays which cache the video and assigning
viewers of the video to the relay peers. It does so by the same
source peer’s algorithm as in Algorithm 1, and the contribution
ratios of the peers (including the offline source peer) will be
updated.
Though the tracker can be a potential bottleneck in many
peer-assisted systems, this problem is minor in our system
due to the following reasons: Given videos in a social media
system are generally short, a video, instead of a chunk, is the
unit for caching at peers. Our previous measurement study
[19] has shown that a large fraction of videos accessed by
users in a social media system are very recently published.
All these show that the number of cache items at each peer in
our system is limited. Hence, the load for cache updates at the
tracker server is much lower than that in a traditional P2P VoD
system. In addition, distributed tracking mechanisms can be
used in large systems for further alleviating the load, such as
DHT (Distributed Hash Table) applied in traditional P2P file
sharing [30]. In our previous work, we have also confirmed
the performance of distributed tracking in P2P VoD streaming
[31].
3) Relay Durations: We have designed that a relay j will
serve an assigned viewer for at least the duration of one
time slot, i.e., Th. During each time slot, new relay requests
from source peers may arrive from time to time, which will
be inserted into set Sj ; peer j will decide its new upload
bandwidth allocation at the beginning of the next time slot.
The choice of Th renders a tradeoff: small Th may lead
to frequent relay switches for source peers, while large Th
may result in less efficient utilization of relay peers’ upload
bandwidth, as relay requests from source peers with high
priority may not be timely addressed. We will evaluate the
effects of different Th values in our experiments.
4) Relay Peer’s Caching Policies: Another limited resource
at a relay peer is its storage. In the context of social media
sharing, newly uploaded videos can typically attract much
more viewers than old ones. Therefore, we apply the following
caching policy at the peers: (1) When a peer has enough
storage capacity, it stores all the videos it has downloaded; (2)
When its storage capacity is exceeded, it starts by removing
videos that are stored by other source peers in order of the
social reciprocity indices.
Finally, note that although we have introduced “time slots”
at peers for execution of source and relay algorithms, our
system operates in a fully asynchronous fashion: individual
peers carry out the designed protocols periodically, while time
slots at different peers do not need to be synchronized at all.
VI. ANALYSIS OF DESIGN EFFECTIVENESS
We analyze our design, and show that it achieves the three
objectives listed in the introduction, namely peers’ maximal
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upload contribution, load balancing among relays, and efficient
upload bandwidth scheduling with preference towards close
social ties.
A. Incentives for Upload Contribution
In our design, relay peers allocate their upload bandwidth
to requesting source peers in descending order of their social
reciprocity indices (RIs) that it calculates. The more help
source peer i has provided to relay peer j or to the entire
system, the larger RI (ej(i)) j will evaluate towards i, and the
more likely j will help i in relaying its video. Source peer
i does not have information about RIs that relay j evaluates
towards other requesting sources, and has no idea whether its
own RI is large enough to be selected by j. Therefore, peer i
has to always keep its RI at a high level, by maximally serving
all its own viewers directly (to prevent decrease of RIs due to
seeking relay help), and by contributing spare upload resource
whenever there is, in order to enhance its system contribution
ratio and peer contribution ratios to others (to boost increase of
its RIs). Consequently, our design effectively incentives upload
bandwidth contributions at all peers in the social media sharing
system. Since some peers may have quite small RIs due to
their low upload capacities, it could be difficult for them to
obtain enough relay help. A possible approach is that these
peers can buy “credits” from the system provider, and pay the
server or other peers to relay videos for them.
In our design, a potential problem may happen that users
who rarely upload videos may not be effectively incentivized
to help as relay peers, since these users do not need to resort
to others as relay helpers. On one hand, we argue that this
problem is minor as follows: Such users are relatively rare in
a social media streaming system, where generating and sharing
contents (with friends and others) are the basic activities of
users, i.e., most users are regularly uploading contents to build
reputations and establish influences [32]. On the other hand,
we can further incentivize all viewers to help regardless of
whether they have contents to upload themselves or not, by
associating contribution ratios of a peer with its downloading
performance, e.g., viewers with better contribution ratios will
be prioritized in receiving the videos from the relays when
bandwidths in the system are scarce. Similar mechanisms have
been discussed in other P2P file sharing systems [29].
B. Load Balancing at Relays
In source peer’s algorithm in Sec. V-B1, a source peer i
chooses relays from all candidates in ascending order of their
RIs, ei(j) = (1−fij) y
′
j
y′j+yj
+fij
Ci(j)
Cj(i)+Ci(j)
, ∀j ∈ Ri. Relays
with smaller RIs, i.e., which source i has helped a lot but
asked little from, or that have contributed less to the system
but taken more from, are more likely to be chosen. If relay j is
chosen and forwards i’s video, y′j and Ci(j) will increase, then
ei(j) will increase, and peer j’s rank lowers in source i’s relay
selection. In the next round, relay j may not be selected by
source i — other candidate relays with smaller contributions
will be chosen — until its contribution level becomes relatively
low again. In this way, our scheme enables balanced resource
utilization at all peers, by always having source peers use
relays with historical lowest contribution levels.
C. Social Preference
Besides historical contributions, social closeness fij be-
tween peers is also considered in evaluating RIs. In relay
peer’s algorithm in Sec. V-C, a relay peer j decides sources
to help according to descending order of their RIs, ej(i) =
(1−fij) y
′
i
y′i+yi
+fij
Cj(i)
Ci(j)+Cj(i)
, ∀i ∈ Sj . A source i with closer
social relationship (larger fij) and more historical contribution
to j (larger Cj(i)Ci(j) ) is more likely to derive a larger ej(i) and
thus has higher priority to be chosen by relay j. Therefore,
mutual relay help between peers with close social ties is
facilitated, while upload bandwidth in the entire system is
efficiently scheduled.
D. Performance in the Presence of Malicious Peers
In a real-world system with our incentive strategies in-
corporated, malicious peers are likely to exist, which make
faked claims on their upload contribution. In our system, a
peer’s upload contribution can be verified by the receiver of
its upload; therefore, the only way for a peer to fake untruthful
contribution is by collusion with some other peers [33], where
peers in the collusion make faked claims that they have
received uploaded streams from each other. These untruthful
claims may increase these peers’ system contribution ratios,
but not the peer contribution ratios.
We argue that such a collusion attack is relatively rare in
a social media streaming system, where videos are mainly
shared among small social groups and a peer may mainly ask
its social friends for the relay. But in case that a collusion
attack does occur, traditional countermeasures can be well
applied in our design, including the following: i) a reputation-
based approach [34], where contribution claims from a peer A
are evaluated by another user B according to how much peer
B trusts peer A, e.g., according to their social relationship;
ii) a credit-based approach [35], where a virtual credit is
received for one unit upload bandwidth contribution, peers’
contribution ratios are calculated based on the credits peers
have earned, and secure mechanisms have been designed for
authenticating the credits.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of our design based on video
sharing traces from Renren and extensive experiments on
PlanetLab.
A. Experimental Settings
We have implemented a prototype peer-assisted social
media sharing system in C++ programming language, and
deployed it on PlanetLab. 200 PlanetLab nodes are used in our
experiments, corresponding to the source peers, relay peers,
and viewers. Peers in the system generate and view videos
according to patterns we summarized from the Renren traces.
(1) We follow the distribution of video links that are imported
by users into Renren, to emulate the new video generation
pattern by source peers in each time slot in our system; (2) We
follow the distribution of videos that are viewed by users on
Renren to emulate how viewer peers select the videos to watch
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in our system; (3) We also follow the social graph on Renren
to calculate the social closeness of friends in our experiments.
In particular, the number of videos generated by a source
peer over time follows a zipf distribution with the skew
parameter s = 0.6123 This distribution is normalized and each
source peer in our system uses this normalized distribution to
decide the probability to generate a new video in a time slot.
After the source peer generates a video, the probability that a
friend of this peer becomes a viewer of the video, follows a
probability of 0.1. A friend peer which viewed the video may
further inform the video to a friend of itself, according to a
random probability of 0.1. The streaming rate of each video is
set to 400 Kbps and the streaming duration is 10 minutes. We
limit the upload bandwidth of the peers (download bandwidth
is never the bottleneck), such that 20% of the nodes have an
upload capacity of 1 Mbps, 60% have upload bandwidth of 2
Mbps, and the rest 20% are 4 Mbps.
Social closeness fij between peers are set following the
social graph from Renren traces. We derive the social close-
ness fij between peer i and j in the following intuitive
fashion: We suppose peers sharing more common friends have
closer relationship than those with fewer common friends, and
evaluate fij as the fraction of common friends of peer i and
j, fij =
|Fi∩Fj |
|Fi∪Fj | , where Fi denotes the set of friends of peer
i.
B. Server Bandwidth Saved by P2P
We first investigate how much server bandwidth can be
saved by the peer-assisted paradigm. In Fig. 6 and 7, we study
the upload contribution by peers and the protocol overhead
in our system, in terms of the maximum number of relays
each source maintains, K , and the length of a time slot, Th.
The upload contribution by peers is defined as the fraction of
video chunks that are uploaded by relay peers to the viewers
in the system throughout the duration of the experiment. The
overhead in our system includes control messages sent by
source peers to discover relays, those used by viewers to
ask for relay peers and those used by relay peers to register
with the tracker server and allocate its upload bandwidth, etc..
We evaluate the control overhead using the ratio of the total
number of bytes in control messages over the total number of
bytes for video distribution in the system.
In Fig. 6, we can see that if Th is too large or too small,
upload contribution by peers is lower. The reason is that for
larger Th, more relay resource is wasted as being reserved for
a source peer which may no longer need it. While for smaller
Th, the relay peer needs to reschedule upload bandwidth
allocation frequently. With respect to control overhead, Fig. 7
shows that smaller Th leads to larger overhead, since more
control messages are sent among relay peers and source peers
for relay scheduling.
On the other hand, we observe that a larger K leads to
higher upload contribution by peers, since source peers can
select among a larger set of relay candidates, and their requests
are more likely to be fully served. However, larger K also
leads to higher control overhead, since more messages are
sent to maintain these many relays at each source peer.
Based on these observations, we have used the default
values of Th = 2 minutes and K = 30 in our other
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experiments, which achieve a good tradeoff between server
load reduction and control overhead.
The above results also show that the bandwidth needed
to send control messages for maintaining our P2P system is
quite low, as compared to the video distribution bandwidth.
In addition, the load on dedicated servers can been signifi-
cantly alleviated by using our P2P incentive mechanism, to
implement a high-quality social media sharing system.
C. Effectiveness of Contribution Incentivization
We investigate the effectiveness of our incentives by eval-
uating a success ratio of relay requests, issued by different
source peers. In our design, the relay request sent from a
source peer to a relay may not be served, as relays carry out
a source selection algorithm when its spare upload bandwidth
cannot serve all the relay requests. If a relay request is not
served, the source has to request relay help again from another
relay, which introduces additional delay for the viewers to
download the videos. Therefore, the request success ratio of a
source peer i, defined as the fraction of the number of its relay
requests that are fully served by corresponding relays (i.e., at
relays j ∈ Ri where a(T )ji = x(T )ij ), over the total number of
relay requests it has issued over time, can be used to represent
distribution efficiency of a peer’s generated videos.
Fig. 8 illustrates the request success ratios of source peers
against their respective average upload bandwidth contributed
for relaying others’ videos over the duration of the experiment.
Each sample in the figure represents one peer in the system.
We observe that peers with higher upload contribution can
obtain larger request success ratio when they need relay help
to distribute their own generated videos. In this way, peers are
incentivized to contribute more upload bandwidth according
to our design.
D. Load Balancing on Peers
We first study mutual relay help between peer pairs. We
compare our design with a simple random scheduling scheme,
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in which source peers randomly select relays from its candi-
date pool and relay peers randomly choose sources to help,
respectively. Fig. 9 plots the overall number of bytes peer i
has helped relay for peer j against the total number of bytes
peer j has uploaded for relaying peer i’s videos throughout
the duration of the experiment, for all pairs of peers in the
system. Each sample in the figure represents one peer pair.
We observe that mutual resource contribution between two
peers is much more balanced with our design than that in the
random scheduling scheme.
Fig. 10 illustrates the load of relay requests at each relay
peer against its system contribution ratio. The load of relay
requests is calculated as the number of requests received by
each relay peer in the last 5 minutes, against the system
contribution ratio at the beginning of this period. Each sample
represents one relay peer. Relay peers with larger SCRs (more
contribution to the system) receive less requests than peers
with smaller SCRs (less contribution to the system), validating
the effectiveness of load balancing among relay peers with our
design.
E. Social Preference
Fig. 11 investigates the impact of social closeness between
sources and relays on the upload resource allocation at the
relays. We categorize source-relay pairs according to the social
closeness between the two (i.e., fij), and count in each
category the number of packets each relay has forwarded
for the corresponding source throughout the duration of the
experiment. This number is further divided by the number of
source-relay pairs in each category to generate the number of
packets relayed per source-relay pair, and plotted against the
social closeness level of the category in a cumulative function
fashion in Fig. 11. We can observe that our design achieves
better social preference, in that relay help is exchanged more
between social friends than that in the random scheduling
scheme. The reason lies in that a pair of social friends may
provide relay help to each other for many times throughout
the video sharing, according to the source and relay selection
strategies in our design.
To further illustrate social preference achieved by our de-
sign, we divide all pairs of peers into 5 groups according to
their social closeness range, and calculate the average request
success ratio (defined in Sec. VII-C) between peer pairs in
each group, and plot the results in Fig. 12. The results again
show that our design achieves better social preference than
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the random scheduling scheme, in that the average request
success ratio is larger when social ties between peer pairs
are stronger with our design, while it does not change much
with the variation of social closeness levels in the random
scheduling scheme.
F. Video Streaming Quality
Finally, we investigate the video streaming quality in our
system. In peer-assisted social media sharing, startup delay
is a most important factor that decides the streaming quality
experienced by viewers. The startup delay consists of two
parts: (1) the delay incurred when a viewer discovers relay
peers from the source peer, and (2) the time used by the viewer
to receive the first video chunk from a relay. Fig. 13 illustrates
the two types of delays in our system versus the number of
relay peers maintained by the source peer. We observe that
smaller K leads to larger delays, and when K is larger than 30,
the delays can be bounded. The reason is that when a source
peer maintains more relay candidates, it becomes easier for
the source peer to assign the requesting viewers with suitable
relays to download video chunks from.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper advocates to utilize social reciprocities among
peers for efficient contribution incentivization and upload
scheduling, to enable efficient social media sharing with low
server costs. We exploit social reciprocity with two light-
weighted give-and-take ratios at each peer, which record
peer’s contributions to social friends and to the entire system,
respectively. We also design efficient peer-to-peer mechanisms
for social media distribution based on a combination of
peers’ social relationship and historical contribution levels.
Through analysis and extensive experiments using a prototype
implementation on PlanetLab, we show that our design is
able to achieve effective incentives for resource contribution,
load balancing among relay peers, as well as efficient social-
aware resource scheduling. All these verify that high-quality
large-scale social media sharing can be achieved based on our
design.
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